What happens, where
Real situations in editors, terminals and browsers, and what AgentPing does about each. Values on this page are masked; the console never sees them either.
A key pasted into a prompt
A developer pastes a failing config, keys included, and asks the agent to fix the deployment.
> this fails in prod, fix it:
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIA••••••••7Q2X
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=wJal••••••••••••
What the model receives
this fails in prod, fix it: AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=«REDACTED:aws_access_key_id:3f2a» AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=«REDACTED:aws_secret_access_key:8be1»
✓ Replaced before sending · the agent carries on
The placeholders stay consistent in the session, so the agent can still reason about “the key”. It can't write a placeholder back into a file over the real value.
The agent opens .env
Debugging a connection error, the agent decides to read the environment file.
Read(.env)
What happens
AgentPing stopped this read: .env holds secrets (AWS access key ID, database password). Ask the user for the values you need, or read .env.example instead.
✕ Read stopped · the agent is told why
The same applies to cloud credentials, SSH keys, keystores and production configs, through the file tool or a shell command.
A shell command prints a customer file
The agent runs a command to look at a data file before writing a migration.
$ head -n 20 data/customers.csv
What happens
AgentPing stopped this command: data/customers.csv holds personal data (Aadhaar number, US SSN).
✕ Stopped before it ran
Commands that display files (cat, head, grep, jq, Get-Content…) have those files checked first. Builds and tests aren't affected.
A customer list pasted into a chat
Someone in support pastes rows from a spreadsheet and asks for a summary.
Summarise these accounts: Asha Rao, Aadhaar 4979 •••• ••47, card 4539 •••• •••• 0312 Ben Cole, SSN 536-••-••81
What's in the message box
Summarise these accounts: Asha Rao, Aadhaar «REDACTED:india_aadhaar:c41d», card «REDACTED:credit_card:77a0» Ben Cole, SSN «REDACTED:us_ssn:09fe»
✓ Replaced in the box before sending
A banner tells the person what was replaced. Works the same in Claude, Gemini, Microsoft Copilot, Perplexity, DeepSeek and Grok.
A screenshot with a key, uploaded to a chat
An error dialog screenshot happens to show an API key and a customer's ID number.
screenshot.png (1.2 MB, image)
What the site receives
screenshot.png cleaned copy
AWS access key ███████████████ blacked out
Aadhaar number ██████████████ blacked out
✓ Cleaned copy uploaded
Text in images and scanned PDFs is read on the computer with macOS Vision or Windows OCR. PDFs, Word, Excel and PowerPoint files are cleaned the same way.
A config file attached to Copilot Chat
In VS Code, a developer attaches appsettings.Production.json and asks why the app can't connect.
#file:appsettings.Production.json why can't the app connect?
What Copilot sends
"ConnectionStrings": {
"Main": "Server=prod-sql;User Id=app;Password=«REDACTED:database_url_password:5d2c»"
}
✓ Prompt rewritten before sending
A package that doesn't exist
The agent adds a dependency with a plausible but wrong name, the kind attackers register to slip in malware.
$ pip install pydantic-setting
What happens
pydantic-setting: no package with this name exists on PyPI, so the agent likely made it up. Did you mean: pydantic-settings?
✕ Install stopped · the agent fixes it
A tool call carrying a token
An agent calls an issue-tracker MCP server and includes a token from a log in the issue body.
create_issue({ title: "Login fails",
body: "... Authorization: Bearer ghp_••••••••• ..." })
What the server receives
create_issue({ title: "Login fails",
body: "... Authorization: Bearer «REDACTED:github_token:a913» ..." })
✓ Cleaned before the tool runs
When your organisation chooses to block
Some teams prefer a hard stop over replacing. One setting in the console:
standard: sensitive_data: block
What people see
AgentPing blocked this: it contains an AWS access key ID. Your organisation doesn't allow sending secrets to AI tools.
✕ Blocked everywhere: editors, terminals and browsers
Checking a pull request
The same detectors run in your pipeline, so secrets don't reach the repository either.
- run: agentping scan --fail-on restricted .
Result
config/settings.py:12 AWS access key ID (restricted)
1 finding · exit code 1
✕ Build fails until it's removed
And in the console
Every one of these becomes a finding your security team can see, by project, device and person: what was found, where, and what happened. Never the value.
| Finding | Where | Project | Device | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AWS access key ID | Claude Code · prompt | payments-api | ana-macbook · ana@acme.com | Replaced |
| Database password | Cursor · read .env | web-app | raj-thinkpad · raj@acme.com | Read stopped |
| Aadhaar number | ChatGPT · paste | Browser | dee-macbook · dee@acme.com | Replaced |
| US SSN | Codex · shell command | data-pipeline | lee-mac · lee@acme.com | Stopped |
See it on your own computer
Install in two minutes. Your first 5 seats are free.